Abstract-The allocation of underutilized spectrum from primary users to secondary users in real time is likely the most promising avenue for advancing efficiency of spectrum use given the ever-increasing demand for transmission. Research in this area has focused on auctions to facilitate the distribution of spectrum, inducing truthful reporting by participants. However, most research has assumed a static or partially dynamic setting. These approaches are unable to capture that spectrum becomes available at random intervals as primary users' needs vary across time; and, similarly, secondary users' needs vary over time. Moreover, frequently there is flexibility regarding the time of transmission-with some transmissions being more urgent and time-sensitive than others. Therefore, existing research cannot be directly applied to such auction environments involving users with variable transmission deadlines, while preserving efficiency and truthfulness. In this paper, we present two truthful online auction mechanisms in dynamic spectrum markets that consider indefinite number of arrival of bidders with varying transmission deadlines and random availability of spectrum units over time. The first proposed mechanism SOADE assumes that the underlying distribution information of bidders and supplies is available. With that knowledge, the mechanism builds around a priority function that determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at an auction considering its valuation, deadline, and uncertainty associated with dynamic arrival of bidders and spectrum availability. The second proposed mechanism xSOADE does not require any distribution knowledge. This mechanism applies bid monotonic spectrum allocation technique, determines the payment based on critical pricing, and enforces penalty rules to avoid manipulation. We prove that both the algorithms are truthful against bid and time-based cheating and individually rational through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. Finally, we analyze the performance of these algorithms under different settings in terms of auction efficiency and auction revenue and demonstrate their effectiveness compared to prior work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
R E-ALLOCATING temporarily unused spectrum from licensed (primary) users to secondary users (referred to as 'secondary spectrum market') has received a lot of attention as a means to support spectrum management. Licensed spectrum holders can make available their spare spectrum across time, frequency, and space for short or long periods, to buyers who may be small wireless networks, individual infrastructure networks, home networks, or an independent unlicensed user. These users' spectrum demands may vary depending on the application type, user traffic, and user mobility. For example, a user with delay-tolerant applications can defer its transmission whereas a user with delay-sensitive applications may require immediate transmission. Auction mechanisms have been studied in the context of spectrum (re-)allocation, with particular attention being paid to the resulting efficiency of spectrum use (both within and across locations, because for a given geographical location, non-interfering users can be allocated the same spectrum to increase both coverage and capacity [1] ), the revenue or profit generated in the process of (re-)allocation [2] , [3] , demand satisfaction [4] , [5] , and other performance metrics. There are additional practical concerns: for instance, by exploiting the inherent characteristics of wireless networks, a bidder may overhear or intercept the bidding information of competitors and gain an advantage [6] ; and, thus, considerable attention has been given to assuring that the auction mechanism induces participants to truthfully report their needs and requirements, rather than have them misrepresent their underlying supply or demand considerations in order to "game" the system and thereby increase their own benefits at the expense of others [7] .
This auction based research constitutes a significant advancement in the potential for effective spectrum management. However, most work focuses on static (or off-line) settings with known number of bidders and supplies, thereby suppressing the inherent dynamic aspects of spectrum availability and spectrum needs discussed at the outset. Also, existing work considers users with no transmission deadlines and therefore, the proposed auction mechanisms are only bid truthful. Unfortunately, given the transmission flexibility the users may manipulate the outcome of these auctions by tweaking their deadlines even in the case of a single unit demand per user (explained with examples in Section II-D). An exception to this is some recent work (e.g., TRADE [8] , Topaz [9] , and TOFU [10] ) that specifically addresses online auction mechanisms while considering dynamic arrival of bidders. The bidders in these auctions place their bids to compete for a fixed number of spectrum units. However, the supply uncertainty, i.e., the dynamics in spectrum availability has not been analyzed in these studies. On the other hand, the study in [1] TORA [11] analyze the auction mechanism considering the dynamics in spectrum availability while the number of bidders is fixed throughout the auction. In contrast, we investigate an auction setting in which both spectrum availability and demand are stochastic throughout the auctions and users' urgency for transmission is also random. In our initial work [12] , we have presented a distribution aware truthful online auction mechanism and demonstrated its performance with existing work. In this work, we present a distribution free auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and prove its properties. We also analyze the performance of these mechanisms with more simulation results.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We study the spectrum allocation problem to secondary users in an online auction setting where idle channels arrive stochastically and the total channel supply is unknown; and bidders with random lifetimes (transmission urgency) arrive at the auction stochastically with the total number of bidders being unknown. We identify the challenges associated with the dynamic auction model and show the vulnerabilities of existing research in such settings.
• We propose an online spectrum auction mechanism SOADE that is based on an endogenous priority value function. This function determines the priority of a bidder at each period given its value and urgency for transmission; and we prove that our proposed mechanism adheres to truthfulness and individual rationality.
• Next, we present a second online auction mechanism xSOADE that does not require any distribution information. The mechanism applies bid monotonic spectrum allocation, periodic monitoring and critical price based payment adjustment to ensure truthful reporting of bidders.
• Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. We compare the performance of the auction mechanism with Topaz [9] in terms of revenue, demand satisfaction, and spectrum utilization.
II. ONLINE DYNAMIC SPECTRUM MARKETS
In this section, we explain the different components of the auction model in the dynamic secondary spectrum market and highlight the design challenges to achieve a truthful auction mechanism.
A. The Auction Model
We consider a time slotted auction environment where an auction is conducted at each period (see Fig. 1a ). The auction consists of the following three entities: 1) Sellers: Primary users are sellers in the spectrum market auctioning their spare units. The spectrum units auctioned by primary users are identical, and these units remain on sale for one period only. A primary user may have more than one spare spectrum unit, however, each spectrum unit is considered for sale independently instead of spectrum bundles. A spectrum unit can be available to a specific geographical location or the entire region L (see Fig. 1b) . So, the total number of available spectrum units at a specific location may vary over time and also, the number of available units at a given time may be different from one location to another. Let S l represent the set of available spectrum units in each location l ∈ L and S represent the overall spectrum set.
2) Buyers: Secondary users as bidders submit their bids for a single spectrum unit. For example, the bid request of a typical bidder 
) where x i ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether bidder i has won (x i = 1) or not (x i = 0), v i denotes bidder's true valuation, and φ i denotes bidder i's payment when it wins the auction. Each spectrum unit stays in the auction for sale for one period only. 3) Auctioneer: The auctioneer is responsible for spectrum allocation and price determination while ensuring truthfulness and individual rationality. An auctioneer must make sure that all sellers and buyers are treated fairly and the mechanism is unbiased to any particular individual.
B. Auction Properties
Definition 1: An online auction mechanism is truthful if and only if no bidder i can improve its utility π i by reporting b i = v i , or falsely reporting its location g i = g i , or arrival time
Definition 2: An online auction mechanism is "ex ante weakly (strongly) individually rational" if all agents' expected utility from the mechanism when entering into the auction are non-negative (positive) conditioning all other bidders bid truthfully.
An online auction mechanism is "ex post weakly (strongly) individually rational" if all agents' realized utility from the mechanism is non-negative (positive) conditioning all other bidders bid truthfully. For any bidder i, the utility π i ≥ 0.
Definition 3: Auction revenue is the total amount of payment received from winning bidders in the auction denoted by i φ i . Auction efficiency is measured in terms of summation of the winning bidders' valuations which is equal to i v i .
We also define few terms to explain our mechanism later on. The highest bidders are referred to the bidders whose bids at current period are the highest. Highest losing bidder refers to the bidder who could win if there is one less bidder with bid higher than its own. Usually this bidder's bid sets the price for the winning bidders.
C. Design Challenges
An online auction in dynamic markets poses several challenges in designing the mechanism. We present three key design challenges as follows: a) Online decision with demand and supply uncertainty:
The primary challenge is to take an online decision without knowing the exact number of supply and bidder in future periods. The mechanism must take into consideration the tradeoff between present opportunity and future uncertainty for efficient spectrum allocation. b) Spectrum reusability: Unlike traditional auctions, the same spectrum unit can be sold to multiple noninterfering secondary users in spectrum auctions. Due to this unique property, more bidders can be served with the same number of spectrum units. While the same spectrum unit can be allocated to two (or more) bidders with very different bids, more than one spectrum unit may be available to a single bidder. Thus, the spectrum assignment becomes challenging while trying to maintain the truthfulness property and achieving high efficiency. c) Time and bid based cheating: Due to the online demand and supply nature of the spectrum auction, bidders may report their bids, arrival time, and deadline untruthfully, and gain advantage in the form of increased utilities [9] . The auction mechanism must provide safeguard against any such attempt of cheating of bidders.
D. Illustration
Before explaining our proposed auction mechanisms, we demonstrate how bidders can gain advantage by misreporting their information, e.g., their arrival times or deadlines in an online dynamic auction setting. Using illustrative examples, we show that existing static or partially dynamic models cannot ensure truthfulness in such cases.
We start with a simple example where each participant reports truthfully. Bidders A, B, and C arrive at time t 1 and bid $100, $80, and $50 respectively. One unit of spectrum also becomes available at the same time. We assume that all three bidders are interfering to each other. [7] in dynamic environments. Fig. 3 . Late arrival manipulation by a bidder while applying static auction rules [7] in dynamic environments. rules presented in [7] where the highest bidders win and the price is determined by the next highest losing bidder in its neighborhood. Accordingly, bidder A wins, and pays $80. At time t 2 , B leaves the auction, and at time t 3 , another spectrum unit becomes available. So, C wins next and pays $0. Finally, another spectrum unit arrives at t 6 but remains unsold. So, the auction efficiency becomes $150 ($100 + $50), revenue becomes $80 ($80 + $0), bidders' satisfaction ratio becomes 2/3, and spectrum utilization ratio becomes 2/3. Fig. 2 demonstrates the arrival and departure of bidders in the auction and also notes down the decision made by the auctioneer at each period following rules in [7] .
Next, we show that a bidder can lie about its arrival time and increase its utility while static rules [7] are applied in an online dynamic environment. In the same previous example, consider bidder A reports its arrival time at t 3 instead of t 1 (t 3 > t 1 ) and thus avoids competition with higher valued bidders. As a result, bidder B wins at t 1 , pays $50, and leaves the auction. At time t 3 , bidder A wins and pays $50, and thus increases its utility by $30. Again, there is no trade at time t 6 . So, the bidder satisfaction ratio and spectrum utilization ratio remain unchanged, but efficiency and revenue become $180 ($100 + $80) and $100 ($50 + $50). Fig. 3 demonstrates this auction scenario. From this instance, it is clear that static auction rules cannot be applied to online auctions in dynamic environments.
Finally, we select a partially dynamic model Topaz [9] and show how a bidder misreports its information and increases its utility in dynamic environments. In the same example, consider that bidder A reports its deadline t 7 instead of t 4 (t 4 < t 7 ). According to Topaz rules, the price is determined at the end Fig. 4 . Late departure manipulation by a bidder while applying Topaz [9] in dynamic environments.
of a winner's deadline that is set to the minimum of the critical price at any period over its lifetime. By reporting late deadline, A wins a spectrum unit, pays $0 and increases its utility to $100. The auction revenue reduces to $0 while all other parameters remain unchanged. Fig. 4 demonstrates the decision made by the auctioneer at each period following rules in [9] . Therefore, these rules cannot ensure truthfulness.
From the above demonstration, it is clear that existing static or partially dynamic model based mechanisms cannot ensure truthfulness in fully dynamic environments. Next, we discuss the design principles and detail algorithms of our proposed mechanisms SOADE and xSOADE and their properties.
III. SOADE DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we propose a bid and time Secondary Online Auction mechanism in Dynamic Environments ('SOADE'). The mechanism is built on the following observation.
To prevent any attempt of strategic manipulation of information (explained in previous section), an auction mechanism must take into consideration the possible winning opportunity of a bidder in future periods of its lifetime. As explained in [13] , bidders in sequential auctions bid their values for the object discounted by the "option value" of future auctions. Similarly in this case, since a bidder has the option of winning a spectrum unit in later periods of its lifetime, a bidder's valuation of a unit at earlier periods is different from its actual valuation. Therefore, an auctioneer must consider a bidder's option value of future periods while determining its value at present period in order to assure truthful reporting of values.
Accordingly, we derive a function, Pval that takes into consideration the "option value" at future periods and given a bidder's information, this function determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at any period of its lifetime. We refer to this rank value as its 'priority' and to Pval function as 'priority function'. This priority value also represents the amount the bidder is willing to pay in that period. An auctioneer uses the priority values of bidders instead of its bid during spectrum allocation. This consideration in priority calculation prevents a bidder from misreporting its bid and attempting any kind of time based cheating (see Theorem 1 below).
Next, we derive the priority function and explain our auction mechanism based on it.
A. Pval: Priority Value Function
We assume that the auctioneer knows the distribution of spectrum availability F m,l for each location l ∈ L, the distribution of arrivals of bidders F n , the distribution of bidders' lifetimes F k , and the distribution of valuations F v . Throughout our analysis, we assume that the support of distribution F k is {1, . . . , k} ⊂ N, and the support of distribution F m,l is {m, . . . , m} ⊂ N. We also consider that a bidder's true valuation of a single spectrum unit is a discrete random variable from the range {v, . . . , v} ⊂ N following cdf F v . We express the priority of a bidder i of value v i with τ periods to live at time t as a function of these parameters. 
Pval works on the basis of Eqn. (3) which states that a bidder's priority value at any period is equal to its true valuation subtracted by the expected payoff from remaining periods of its lifetime.
Here, β τ (v i ) denotes the priority value of a bidder of value v i with τ remaining periods in its lifetime. Also,
) denote bidder i's expected payoff and the losing probability with τ remaining periods of its lifetime i . Next, we calculate these two sub-components in the priority functionexpected payoff and losing probability. A bidder's expected payoff at any given period will be the summation of expected payoff conditioning on the available spectrum units m in its location multiplied by the probability of the availability of that number of units ( f m ).
The conditional expected payoff, E[π τ (v i |m)] depends on the winner's payment which can be any value between 0 and its priority value at that period β τ (v i ) (since price is set by the highest losing bidder). We express E[π τ (v i |m)] in terms of the probability of all possible prices. Pr(Z (m) = z) denotes the probability that the mth highest priority value is equal to z in the remaining population.
The pricing probability Pr Z (m) = z can be expressed as differences between cdfs F (m)
z (z) denotes the cdf of the highest priority value among the remaining population. Simplifying the results in Eqn. (5), we obtain
Similarly, we calculate the losing probability of a bidder with τ remaining periods conditioning on the number of available spectrum units in that location l ∈ L.
Here, L τ (v i |m) denotes the probability that a bidder of value v i with τ periods to live does not win the auction. This probability is equal to the probability that the price is higher than the bidder's priority value β τ (v i ).
Both Eqns. (6) and (8) z (z) that denotes the cdf of the m-th highest priority value among the remaining population of active bidders.
Here, Pr(N(z) = i) denotes the probability that there are exactly i bidders in the population with priority value greater than z. Since the population consists of bidders with different remaining periods, these i bidders (with priority value greater than or equal to z) may come from any of these bidder groups. Therefore, we take all possible combinations of i bidders with priority value greater than or equal to z from the population.
Here, f (a) represents the probability of having this combination [a 1 . . . a k ] from k groups. Pr(N j (z) = a j ) denotes the probability that there are exactly a j bidders (with j remaining periods in their lifetimes) whose priority value is greater than z. Here, F j (z) denotes the cdf of priority value of bidders with j remaining periods of their lifetimes. 
B. Algorithm
In this section, we explain the auction mechanism constructed around the priority function. To begin with, we define the conflict graph G(t) that represents the interference relationship among the active bidders at time t. We also use G i (t) to represent the list of active bidders who are within the interference range of user i at time t.
At each period, the auction mechanism consists of four steps.
Step 1 (Screening): A bidder's identity must be validated by the auctioneer before it participates in the auction. Each bidder is registered off-line with a centralized database that the auctioneer has access to. On successful registration, bidder i is assigned an encryption key K i . Any lightweight encoding scheme, e.g., Paillier's homomorphic encryption [14] can be used for this purpose. A new bidder submits its encrypted bid request to the auctioneer with its credentials and upon approval from the auctioneer, it enters the auction.
Step 2 (Ranking): At the beginning of each period t, the auctioneer considers only the active bid requests in A(t). New bidders are added after the screening process, and the conflict graph G(t) is updated as well. Note that the conflict graph is updated at the arrival of new bidder (also, at the departure of a winner or losing bidder). For each active bidder, its priority value is accessed from the priority table, PT which is populated based on the function Pval (explained in Section III-A). The active bidders are then stored in B in a nonincreasing order of their priority values. Bidders are considered for spectrum allocation in this order.
Step 3 (Allocation): The allocation process starts with an empty set C. For each bidder i ∈ B, the auctioneer checks the list of its interferers G i (t) and finds the lowest index channel that is not assigned to any of its interferers. Here, G i (t) denotes the list of active users interfering with bidder i. If there is an unassigned channel available, it assigns the channel c to user i and it is moved in C. The function NextAvailable(i, G i (t), S) takes user i and its interferer list G i (t) as input, and returns the lowest available channel index.
Step 4 (Pricing): In the final step, the winning price is determined for each winner. Each winner i ∈ C pays the amount equal to the highest priority value of a bidder j ∈ G i (t) that has not won the auction. If there are more channels than the number of interferers, the user wins at no cost. The function NotAllocatedNeigh(i, G i (t), S) searches through the neighbor list to find the highest priority bidder from its neighborhood G i (t) that has not been allocated any channel. A bidder leaves the auction immediately if it wins a spectrum unit or stays in the auction until its lifetime expires.
The auctioneer sends an encrypted message to the winner containing the winner id and payment amount. The winner decrypts the message, pays the price, and uses the spectrum. Note that the price is finalized and is not adjusted afterwards. Any other user overhearing the message cannot decrypt the message. Thus, the winning price and winner identity are not revealed to all and a returning user does not gain any benefit. All the steps of the auction mechanism is summarized in Algorithm 1 for convenience.
Example: To illustrate how the algorithm works we solve the Eqns. for n ∼ Poisson(2), m ∼ U[0, 2], and k ∼ U [1, 3] , and determine the priorities of bidders. We reenact the example scenario in Fig. 2 . At time t 1 , the effective bid of bidder A, B, and C will be their priority values $58, $80, and $41 respectively. According to Algorithm 1, bidder B wins and pays $58. Similarly, the effective bid of bidder A and C at time t 2 are $67 and $43. So, bidder A wins and pays $43. Note that, bidder B wins before bidder A although B's actual value is smaller than A's. This is because B's priority is higher than A's priority at t 1 . Auction efficiency is $180 ($100 + $80) and revenue is $101 ($58 + $43).
C. Time Complexity
With the distribution information, the priority of a bidder at different periods to live can be precalculated. Considering n bidders and m supplies at each period, we calculated time complexity of the Algorithm 1. The conflict graph G takes O(m|E|) ( where E denotes the edges in the graph), priority assignment takes O (1) , and sorting the bidders takes O(n log n).
For each winning bidder, finding an available channel for allocation and payment determination takes at most n comparisons. So, the overall time complexity of Algorithm 1
is O(mn).
IV. SOADE PROPERTIES
We analyze the characteristics of the priority value function and prove the useful properties of the auction mechanism.
Lemma 1: The priority value of bidder i at different periods in its lifetime l i is monotonic, i.e.,
Proof: By construction, for any period in its lifetime, a bidder's expected payoff E[π τ (v i )] ≥ 0. The priority value of a bidder at any period is calculated by subtracting the cumulative expected payoff of remaining periods from its true valuation, and since each remaining period contributes a non-negative component to the total,
Lemma
Due to their different valuations, the expected payoff at the last period of their lifetime will be different. Given everything remains same, the higher the valuation of a bidder, the less competition it faces from the young bidders. This implies that a bidder with higher value (v 2 ) expects higher payoff than that of a bidder with lower value (v 1 ) at the same period. As a result, the priority of a bidder of value v 2 cannot be lower than that of a bidder of value v 1 . So, β 2 (v 1 ) ≤ β 2 (v 2 ). As the value increases, the change in priority value of bidders at their second last period with respect to their values decreases. By the same argument, we can generalize the statement for τ > 2.
Next, we prove the auction properties -truthfulness and individual rationality.
Theorem 1: The proposed auction mechanism SOADE is bid and time truthful.
Proof: Let us consider bidder i with a manipulated bid request (g i , o i , d i , v i ) , its remaining lifetime at time t, τ = d i − t + 1 and its priority value at time t is β τ (v i ). The manipulator can lie about one or more parameters in its bid request. We prove that lying about any of its information (location, arrival time, value, and deadline) does not bring any benefit to the manipulator.
(a) g i = g i : Lying about its location will not give any benefit to the manipulator. It might win but in that case it will be assigned spectrum specific to that location, not the location it actually resides. (b) o i > o i : This means that a manipulator reports late arrival time and pretends not to be available when it is actually active. The manipulator cannot learn about the auction state during those periods since the winner information is encrypted. So, the manipulator will not have any added advantage for later periods. On the contrary, it will miss an opportunity to win spectrum in the skipped periods. Therefore, reporting late arrival will not benefit the manipulator. (c) o i < o i : The priority value of a bidder is always determined based on its value and departure time. Therefore, claiming early arrival time in bid request will not change its priority. Also, if the manipulator reports o i < o i , it pretends to be active in a period when it was not actually present. So, even if the manipulator is considered as a winner at that period, it cannot use the spectrum unit. Furthermore, it will lose any opportunity to win it in later periods. So, reporting early arrival will not benefit the manipulator.
There are possible two cases while a manipulator reports longer deadline.
• Case 1: the manipulator wins the auction at d i ≥ t > d i , i.e., after the actual deadline has expired. Although the manipulator wins, it has no use of the spectrum unit but still has to pay. This results in negative utility.
• Case 2: the manipulator wins at t ≤ d i . Since τ < τ , according to Lemma 1,
If a manipulator wins an auction with priority value β τ (v i ), its payment φ i must be less than or equal to its priority value. So, the relationship holds as follows: (v i ).
According to Lemma 1,
We calculate the expected payoff of the manipulated bidder at time t,
The truthful bidder would not win the auction in the current period; however, its expected payoff from remaining periods of its lifetime is greater than that of a manipulator. The truthful bidder's expected payoff at the last period is
Thus, a truthful bidder's expected payoff is higher than that of a manipulator.
Therefore, a manipulator will not gain any advantage by reporting its deadline incorrectly. (f) Next, let us consider the case when a manipulator overbids, i.e., v i > v i . Without loss of generality, let us assume that a bidder i wins an auction with τ remaining periods of its lifetime. According to Lemma 2, the priority value of a manipulator (β τ (v i )) is higher than that of a truthful bidder (
Three possible scenarios may occur based on when the bidder i wins and how much it pays φ i .
In this case, the truthful bidder also wins and achieves the same payoff. So, the bidder will not gain any advantage by misreporting its value.
In this case, the manipulator wins and pays more than its true valuation that will result in negative payoff.
In this case, the manipulator only wins because it overbids in that auction period. The expected payoff of the manipulator at this period is
On the other hand, the truthful bidder loses the current auction; however, its expected payoff from the remaining periods will be higher than that of the manipulator. The truthful bidder's expected payoff at the last period only is higher than that (see Eqn. (12)).
Therefore, overbidding does not increase a bidder's expected payoff, and the manipulator does not gain any advantage by lying about its valuation. (g) Finally, consider a case where a manipulator underbids, i.e., v i < v i . Again, according to Lemma 2, the priority value of a truthful bidder is higher than the value of the manipulator, i.e., β τ (v i ) ≤ β τ (v i ). Therefore, if a manipulator underbids, its priority value at any period of its lifetime will always be lower than or equal to that of the truthful bidder. This implies that if a bidder wins by underbidding, it could have also won by bidding truthfully.
From Eqn. (11), (12), (14), we find that the expected payoff of a bidder with either manipulated value or manipulated deadline is smaller than that of a truthful bidder at the last period of its lifetime. This result also holds when a bidder combines any of these manipulated information (arrival time, deadline and value). Based on the above discussion, we conclude that a bidder will not benefit by misreporting its location, bid, arrival time, and deadline, and the proposed mechanism is time and bid truthful.
Theorem 2:
The proposed auction mechanism SOADE is ex ante strongly individually rational.
Proof: There are two entities (sellers and bidders) in the auction, and we have to prove the rationality for both the entities. Let us calculate the expected payoff E[π j ] of seller j. The seller's payoff depends on the price range (between 0 and v inclusive) a bidder pays to win an auction.
with τ remaining periods in its lifetime can be calculated using Eqn. (6) which is also greater than 0. Therefore, both the entities in the auction achieve positive utility, and thus the proposed mechanism is ex ante strongly individual rational.
Theorem 3:
The proposed auction mechanism SOADE is ex post weakly individually rational.
Proof: There can be two possible auction outcomes from the perspective of a seller. First, the number of active bidders is less than or equal to the number of supplies. In this case, all active bidders become winners, and the seller is paid 0. In case there is no bidder to sell the spectrum, spectrum unit remains unsold, and the seller achieves 0 utility. Second, the number of active bidders is greater than the number of spectrum units. The winning price is then determined by the highest priority value of the losing bidder. So, the sellers are paid some positive amount and achieves non-negative utility.
There can be three possible auction outcomes from the perspective of bidder i with τ remaining periods of its lifetime. First, the bidder departs without winning and earns zero utility. Second, the bidder wins and pays φ i . Since the winning price of a bidder is always less than its priority value at that period and the highest priority of a bidder is equal to its valuation v i , φ i ≤ v i . So, the bidder achieves utility equal to v i − φ i ≥ 0.
Therefore, both the entities in the auction achieve nonnegative utility, and thus the proposed mechanism is ex post weakly individual rational.
V. XSOADE DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
While SOADE ensures truthfulness and individual rationality, it is dependent on distribution knowledge of auction entities. This information may not be readily available and the mechanism may suffer from inaccurate estimation of distribution parameters. Therefore, we present a second mechanism, xSOADE ('x' stands for without distribution) that calculates the payment amount and allocates spectrum without any distribution knowledge of the auction entities. We discuss the design principle of the auction mechanism next.
A. Design Principle
Hajiaghayi [15] characterized the truthful online auction mechanisms where bidders arrive and depart dynamically with one unit of demand. The analysis establishes two necessary and sufficient criteria for truthful online auctions with two-dimensional bidders (bid and time).
The first criterion is referred to as 'monotonicity', which ensures the existence of a payment rule that truthfully carries out an allocation rule. This implies that a bidder with a higher bid wins over a bidder with lower bid (given every other parameter remains same). The second criterion is referred to as 'critical pricing' to determine the payment of a winning bidder. In a static setting, a winner's payment is determined according to VCG mechanism [7] . The price is set to the highest losing bidder that could have won if the winner were not present in the auction. However, the VCG auction mechanism relies on the optimal allocation and therefore, it is inapplicable to an online setting (since it is not possible to find an optimal allocation with uncertainty involved in future availability). Instead, a winner's payment is adjusted over its lifetime to prevent any time based cheating. This adjustment leads to another opportunity for a manipulator to report its deadline longer (an example is demonstrated in Section II-D). This manipulation opportunity is not explored previously with the assumption that allocated resources are available for use only at the end of the winners' deadlines. This assumption is not true in online settings where spectrum units come with a lifetime (expire in one period) and winners have to use the units instantly. To tackle this vulnerability, we introduce an additional technique 'heartbeat monitoring' which periodically monitors a bidder's presence throughout the auction.
1) Monotonicity:
To ensure the monotonicity property in the proposed mechanism, xSOADE attempts to allocate spectrum units in the increasing order of bids of the bidders without prioritizing anyone in terms of deadline or any other parameters. This ensures that given two bidders with same parameters, the higher-valued bidder wins over the lower one.
2) Critical Pricing: To facilitate a bidder's timing flexibility, a winning bidder's payment is not finalized at the period it wins; rather the final payment of a winning bidder is set to the minimum critical price over its entire lifetime. Thus the final payment of a bidder i, φ i is expressed as follows:
To determine the critical price at period t, we follow a modified VCG rule. The critical price is determined in two steps. At the winning period, a bidder i's payment φ i (t) is set to the highest losing bidder that could have won if it were not present. In later remaining periods of its lifetime (i.e., t ≤ d i ), the payment is adjusted based on the available bidders in that auction period based on the net revenue outcome R(t) of that period.
3) Heartbeat Monitoring: We introduce a monitoring mechanism in order to refrain bidders from reporting longer deadline. This is applicable to only those bidders who have won their units before deadline. The auctioneer instructs the winning bidder to announce its presence through a heartbeat
Algorithm 2 xSOADE: Bid and Time Truthful Online Auction in Dynamic Environments Without Distribution Knowledge screen and validate new bidders and update A(t) Q (t) = SelectCandidate(A(t), G, S) [W (t), C] = confirmWinners(Q (t), W (t), G, S) remove expired bidders and update W (t)

HeartbeatMonitor(W (t))
message at random intervals. This process is repeated until the bidder reaches deadline. This 'heartbeat message' helps the auctioneer to keep track of the winners and maintain their payment records. If the auctioneer does not receive a message from a scheduled winner, a penalty is charged to that bidder's account that is equal to the loss the auctioneer has encountered for its participation in the auction.
B. Algorithm
In this section, we explain the auction mechanism for winner selection and payment determination in detail. We use several terms to better explain the mechanism. We have already defined 'active bidders' and it is denoted as A(t). Additionally, we define 'active winner' (denoted as W (t)) to represent a list of bidders which have won before their deadlines expire.
Both these lists will be updated throughout the auction. Additionally, the mechanism maintains two periodic information of each bidder i at time t -payment amount φ i (t) and penalty amount ρ i (t). By default, both values are set to 0. xSOADE works in several steps at each period t. First, new incoming bidders are validated by the auctioneer (same as SOADE). A candidate list Q (t) is selected from the pool of active bidders A(t) for spectrum allocation and their payments are also determined. Next, the mechanism finalizes the list of winners and readjusts the payment of active winners by considering the trade-off between auction revenue and auction efficiency. Finally selected bidders are moved to the list W (t). The mechanism informs the winners, schedules message communication with the winning bidders, updates winners' payment and penalizes the manipulators as needed.
Step 1 (Screening): The newly arrived bidders are validated by the auctioneer similar to SOADE and A(t) is updated accordingly.
Step 2 (Candidate Selection): Active bidders are sorted according to their bids in B. For each bidder i ∈ B, the auctioneer checks the spectrum pool S. If it is possible to allocate a unit to the bidder i without interfering its neighbors (who have already been selected as candidates), the bidder is assigned a lowest numbered channel from the pool and moved to the candidate list Q (t). Next, we determine the payment for each possible winner in the candidate set. For each such candidate i ∈ Q (t), we find the critical neighbor j ∈ G i (t) who could be selected if this bidder were not present in the auction. If no such neighbor is found, its payment is set to zero. Otherwise, bidder i's payment is set equal to the bid of bidder j. G i (t) is defined in Eqn. (10) . Function criticalNeighbor() returns the index of the critical neighbor of bidder i.
Step 3 (Winner Confirmation): In this step, we calculate the payment amount of each bidder i ∈ W (t) with respect to active bidders in A(t). For each bidder i, the auctioneer checks the neighborhood in the current context, looks for critical neighbors, and records the payment information. If the payment is greater than its current payment amount, it is not updated. Otherwise, the new payment information φ i (t) along with the payment setting bidder is saved in a separate list C. The auctioneer then calculates the total revenue R(t) from this period t. For each bidder i ∈ C, the auctioneer calculates how the revenue changes at the cost of bidder i. While removing bidder i reduces the revenue R(t) by its payment amount φ i (t), it may also reduce the loss from payment readjustment of the
else restore i end if end for end procedure corresponding active winner. Thus, the auctioneer checks the bidders to increase the revenue and finally selects the combination that maximizes the revenue. At the end of the process, remaining bidders in the list are announced as winners, payment of active winners are adjusted, and finally the winners are moved to the active winner list Q (t).
Step 4 (Heartbeat Monitoring): For each new winner i ∈ W (t), the auctioneer selects a random period from the interval (t, d i ], and a heartbeat message is scheduled for transmission. The heartbeat message is a small message containing the bidder's id to notify its presence to the auctioneer. If a bidder fails to notify at the scheduled interval, the penalty amount ρ i (t) is charged to the bidder's account. On the other hand, if a bidder successfully sends the heartbeat message, the penalty is reset to zero. Note that the penalty amount is carried over to the next round until the deadline expires. Therefore, a bidder's penalty will be proportional to its lie regarding the deadline.
procedure HEARTBEATMONITOR(W (t))
for i ∈ W (t) do if heartbeat received then ρ i (t) = 0 schedule heartbeat at rand( t, d i ) else charge ρ i (t) to its account W (t) = W (t) -{i}
end if end for end procedure
Example: To illustrate how the Algorithm 2 works we reenact the example scenario in Fig. 2 . At time t 2 , bidder A wins, and its initial payment is set to $80. Next at time t 3 , bidder C is selected as a candidate with initial payment of $0. A's payment will also be reduced to $50. So, if C is selected as a winner the revenue R(t) will be $0 − $80 + $50 = ($30). If C is unselected, R(t) will be $0. Therefore, C is unselected, auction efficiency is $100 and revenue is $80.
C. Time Complexity
In Algorithm 2, the first procedure selects the candidate list first by sorting the current bidders, and then for each bidder finds the critical neighbor and sets an estimated price. Sorting takes O(n log n) while finding critical neighbor for each bidder takes O(n). So, the overall time complexity of the first procedure is O(n 2 ). The second procedure adjusts the price of pending bidders and selects the winners from the current period. Finding conflicting neighbors for each pending bidder takes O(n) and there can be at most n bidders. So, the overall time complexity of the procedure is O(n 2 ).
VI. XSOADE PROPERTIES
Theorem 4:
The proposed auction mechanism xSOADE is bid and time truthful.
Proof: Let us consider bidder i with a manipulated bid request (g i , o i , d i , v i ) , its remaining lifetime at time t, τ = d i −t+1. The manipulator can lie about one or more parameters in its bid request. We prove that lying about any of its information (location, arrival time, value, and deadline) does not bring any benefit to the manipulator.
(a) g i = g i : using the same logic we can conclude that a manipulator will not earn any benefit by misreporting its location. (b) o i < o i : When the manipulator reports early arrival, there can be two cases. First, it wins the spectrum (at time t) before it actually needs, i.e., o i ≤ t < o i . In that case, it will not be considered for allocation at later periods. So, the manipulator cannot achieve better result from false reporting. Second, it wins the spectrum at time t where t ≥ o i . In that case, the true bidder and the manipulator experiences the same environment which prevents any advantage of misreporting. (c) o i > o i : If the manipulator reports late arrival, it does not increase its chance of winning. On the contrary, it might miss an opportunity to win at periods
First of all, the mechanism does not prioritize a bidder with shorter deadline than that of a bidder with longer deadline. So, at a given period, a bidder with earlier deadline has no extra benefit. If the manipulator reports early departure, it misses later opportunity of winning had it not won by that time. Even if it wins, its payment amount only reduces at later periods. So, by reporting early departure it might end up paying more than it should in this mechanism.
The manipulator may end up winning at a time t when it no longer needs the spectrum, i.e., d i < t < d i . On the other hand, if a bidder wins beforehand (i.e., t ≤ d i ), the payment is adjusted throughout its lifetime. However, since the winner has to respond periodically to the auctioneer, a manipulator will fail to do so and that will cause additional penalty. So, a manipulator will end up paying more that it should be. (f) v i < v i : The bidders are considered for spectrum allocation in the increasing order of their bids which guarantees that a bidder with higher value wins over a bidder with lower value given everything remains same. So, if a manipulator wins true bidder also wins but the reverse may not be true. (g) v i > v i : There are two cases we need to consider when a manipulator overbids its value based on its payment
If the manipulator's final payment is less than its actual bid it means that there exits at least one period in its lifetime where a bidder with value φ i could win if it were not present. This also means that any bidder with value higher than that also wins that auction otherwise that value would be the payment amount. Thus, both manipulator and true bidder wins and pays the same amount. Therefore, no additional benefit is achieved by overbidding. (ii) v i < φ i < v i : In this case, the manipulator wins but the true bidder oes not. So, the true bidder does not pay anything. However, the manipulator pays more than its actual value which results in negative utility. Thus any combination of these misreports will not help a manipulator to gain more profit than a true bidder. 
Theorem 5:
The proposed auction mechanism xSOADE is individually rational.
There are only two outcomes possible for a bidder in the auction. First, the bidder does not win and its lifetime expires. In this case, the bidder pays nothing and earns zero utility. Second, the bidder wins and it pays φ i . The payment amount is set to the minimum of the critical price over its lifetime. Due to monotonic spectrum allocation, φ i ≤ v i . So, π i ≥ 0. Similarly, the seller is paid at least zero which ensures rationality for sellers. Therefore, both the bidders and sellers are individually rational in this algorithm.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate different auction settings to verify the properties and analyze the performance of the proposed auction mechanisms. We assume that the bidders' arrival follows a Poisson distribution and spectrum availability follows a Uniform distribution [9] . Also, both the bidders' lifetime and the bidders' valuation follow a Uniform distribution with support {1, 2, 3} and {1, . . . , 100} respectively. We firstanalyze the priority function, followed by the truthfulness test, and finally, we compare the performance of SOADE and xSOADE with Topaz [9] based on various metrics.
A. Priority Analysis
For a specific configuration of the auction environment in terms of F n , F m , F k , we solve the priority value function to find the priority value of a bidder at different periods of its lifetime. To start with, we assume that the bidders' priorities are equal to their valuations independent of their lifetime. We simulate the auction for 10000 time periods and if the estimated priority values match with the simulation outcome, we stop the simulation, and the results are recorded. Otherwise, the next iteration starts with the result of the previous iteration and continues until the result converges. For statistical confidence, the entire process was repeated 10 times, and we take an average over all these runs to construct the priority table.
1) Priority Value: First, we consider an auction environment where new bidders arrive following a Poisson distribution with a mean value of 2 and lifetime of the bidders are uniformly distributed over {1, 2, 3}. Also, the number of available spectrum units at each period is uniformly distributed over {0, . . . , 4} with a mean value of 2. Fig. 5a shows the priority value of a bidder at different periods of its lifetime under this setting. For example, the priorities of a bidder of value $100 are $40, $45, and $100 with 3, 2, and 1 period to live. As expected, a bidder's priority value increases as it approaches the end of its lifetime.
Next, we set the bidder arrival rate following a Poisson distribution with a mean value of 3 and the lifetime of the bidders are uniformly distributed over {1, 2, 3}. We vary the supply availability rate {0, 1, 2}, {0, . . . , 4}, {0, . . . 6} with mean 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Fig. 5b shows a decrease in the priority value of a bidder with an increase in supply rate. This is because more supply per period increases the winning probability at early periods, and the expected payoff from the remaining lifetime periods increases which decreases the priority value of the bidder.
Third, we vary the mean value of the bidder arrival rate while the lifetime of the bidders are uniformly distributed over {1, 2, 3}. We plot the priority value of a bidder with 2 and 3 remaining periods of its lifetime in Fig. 5c . The mean arrival rate are considered 2 and 3. The result shows that the priority value of a bidder at the same period increases with an increase in the bidder arrival rate. This is because with the arrival of more bidders, the auction gets more competitive, and the winning probability decreases. This leads to a decrease in the expected payoff which is followed by a higher priority value.
2) Statistical Analysis:
We further analyze the mechanism to understand its impact of the priority function on winner selection and spectrum allocation. We consider that bidders follow a Poisson distribution with mean 2.0 and supplies arrive randomly in 0, 1, 2 units. Bidders' lifetimes are chosen from the same set as before. According to SOADE, a bidder's priority is considered instead of its actual bid to determine the spectrum price at the auction. Therefore, it is important to understand the distribution of bidders' priority at each auction period. We record priorities of active bidders and winning price at each auction period over 1000 runs. For clarity and convenience, the result is shown by dividing the bidders into 10 groups based on their values. For example, bidders of value between 1 and 10 belong to group 1, bidders of value between 11 and 20 belong to group 2 and so on.
The above statistical analysis gives an understanding of pricing and priority at the auction. Fig. 6a shows the distribution of active bidders in terms of their priorities. As shown, there are few bidders with higher priority values while the bidders' density is the highest in the range between 61 and 70. Next, we show the distribution of winners' payments in Fig. 6b . The result shows that almost 50% times a winner pays nothing when sellers do not set any reserved price. The same range dominates the payment distribution as in the priority distribution when there are not enough spectrum for all the bidders. Finally, we analyze the expected utility of bidders with different lifetimes in the auction in Fig. 6c . The result shows that a bidder with higher lifetime and value tends to achieve higher utility.
B. Truthfulness Test
We want to prove through simulation that a bidder under the proposed algorithms cannot increase its utility by lying about its bid and lifetime and truthful reporting ensures highest utility. To verify this, we consider that bidders arrive at the auction following a Poisson distribution with mean 3.0 and spectrum becomes available following a Uniform distribution with mean 1.0. The bidders' valuations and lifetimes are randomly drawn from {1 . . . 100} and {1, 2, 3} respectively.
The test is performed as follows: we select a candidate bidder with value of v and lifetime of . We investigate how its utility changes if the bidder reports its value v and lifetime l instead of its actual value and lifetime. We keep the same auction environment for all three algorithms and record the utility achieved in the auction. We run the same experiment for 200 times and take an average result. We select three different combinations of candidate bidders with the value of 100 and with 1, 2, or 3 periods of lifetime. We run all three algorithms for all three different combinations.
The first set of results shows the performance of the three algorithms with maximum value of 100 and lifetime of 1 periods in Fig. 7 . The result shows that when a manipulator reports longer than its true deadline, both SOADE and xSOADE successfully prevents the manipulator from gaining any benefits from that. SOADE precalculates its virtual bid at each time period with the priority function. Its priority value is adjusted according to its reported longer deadline which makes its priority less than its actual one. Also in SOADE, the bidder could win at later periods when they no longer need the spectrum and end up paying for spectrum they cannot use any more. On the other hand, the heartbeat protocol in xSOADE makes sure that reporting longer deadline causes significant penalty to the manipulator. As it is shown in Fig. 7 and 8, a bidder with false (longer) deadline pays the penalty even if it wins within its actual lifetime.
Similarly, the second set of results shows the performance of the three algorithms with maximum value of 100 and 2 period of lifetime in Fig. 8 . The latter results are consistent with the former one. Thus, the simulation results prove the truthfulness of the proposed algorithms and a bidder cannot increase its utility by reporting late departure in contrast to Topaz.
C. Performance Evaluation
We have considered two different setups and four metrics to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. The performance metrics are as follows
• spectrum utilization ratio -it denotes the ratio between the number of bidders who won a spectrum unit and the number of spectrum units auctioned for sale.
• bidder satisfaction ratio -it denotes the ratio between the number of bidders who won a spectrum unit and the number of bidders who participated in the auction.
• total value of winner -it denotes the total values of winning bidders which is related to the efficiency of the auction.
• total sales revenue -it denotes the total price from selling spectrum units to bidders. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work addressing both the dynamic arrival of bidders and dynamic spectrum supply. The performance of an auction algorithm depends on several factors including the interference relationship among bidders, distribution of bidders' arrival and supply availability. As it is proved in [15] that there is no deterministic truthful mechanism with constant competitive revenue compared to off-line VCG mechanism, we select Topaz [9] for performance comparison. Topaz successfully handles the dynamic arrival of bidders but considers a fixed number of available spectrum units. It allocates spectrum to the bidders in the non-increasing order of their bids whenever a new bidder arrives. In order to handle the dynamic supply, we also invoke the allocation procedure when new spectrum arrives at the auction. Note that Topaz is not truthful since a bidder can gain by reporting a longer deadline (see in Fig. 4) . Additionally, we have considered an auction setting where spectrum supply is fixed.
1) Performance With No Spectrum Reusability:
In the first setup, we consider an auction environment where all bidders interfere with each other and the conflict graph is a complete graph. We assume that the bidders arrive following a Poisson distribution, and their lifetime is uniformly drawn from the set {1, 2, 3}. We change the mean arrival rate of the bidders between 2.0 and 3.0. We assume that supply arrives at each period following a Uniform distribution from the set {0, 1, 2}. Fig. 9 shows the simulation results of four performance metrics of the three approaches. In the case of spectrum utilization ratio (Fig. 9a) and bidder satisfaction ratio (Fig. 9b) , SOADE performs marginally better than Topaz and xSOADE. This is because in SOADE, a bidder with smaller value and shorter lifetime may have higher priority than a bidder with larger value and longer lifetime and wins over it. Also, as the bidders' arrival ratio increases, the spectrum utilization ratio increases. An exact opposite trend is observed in the case of the bidder satisfaction ratio. The next figure (Fig. 9c) reflects the auction efficiency of the auction. Again SOADE and xSOADE show slightly better results than Topaz. Also, in general, the average value increases with the increase in bidders' arrival rates. Finally, we compare the winner's payment (denoted as auction revenue) in Fig. 9d . The result shows that revenue increases with the increase in arrival rate due to the presence of more competitors in the auction. For a fixed user arrival rate, xSOADE generates more revenue than Topaz but less than SOADE. This is because the winning price in SOADE depends on the priority values of the participating bidders while xSOADE always maximizes the revenue at each period even at the cost of a bidder.
2) Performance With Spectrum Reusability: In the second setup, we consider that nodes are randomly distributed within a 250m × 250m area. The interference range of a user is set to 50m, i.e., two nodes will interfere with each other if they are less than or equal to 50m apart. As before, the bidders' lifetimes are uniformly drawn from the set {1, 2, 3} while the mean bidders' arrival rate is changed between 16 and 24. We also consider that the spectrum unit is uniformly drawn from the set {0, 1, 2} with mean 1. The simulation result is presented in Fig. 10 . The result shows similar pattern to the first setup and SOADE and xSOADE generate more revenue than Topaz.
Finally, we consider an auction environment where spectrum supply is fixed. We get similar results where SOADE and xSOADE achieve higher revenue and higher bidder satisfaction ratio. However, as the results are similar, we skip the figures here.
In summary, with fixed or dynamic spectrum supply, with or without spectrum reusability, SOADE and xSOADE generate more auction revenue in addition to slightly increasing spectrum utilization ratios, bidder satisfaction ratios, and winners' valuations, while preserving truthfulness in comparison to Topaz.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Recent research focuses on online spectrum auction models [9] - [11] , [16] . The analysis in [13] in a sequential auction reveals that supply uncertainty leads to a decreasing price sequence; however the expected price is increased if supply information becomes available in the course of a sequential auction. Considering the online arrival of users, Deek et al. [9] proposed an efficient online spectrum auction mechanism with preemption which prevents both bid-based and time-based cheating. However, it does not provide a performance bound on revenue with respect to the optimal solution. Under the same online auction model, Xu and Li [10] proposed TOFU, another online semi-truthful spectrum auction scheme with channel preemption. In contrast to previous solutions, TOFU achieves only semi-truthfulness where users may underbid to gain. The bidders in these auctions place their bids to compete for a fixed number of spectrum units. However, the supply uncertainty, i.e., the dynamics in spectrum availability has not been analyzed in these studies. On the other hand, TORA [11] analyzes the auction mechanism considering the dynamics in spectrum availability while the number of bidders is fixed throughout the auction. Recently, Hyder et al. [17] analyzed the bidders' behavior in the dynamic online auction setting considering bidders of same valuations which may not be practical.
Nevertheless, a practical system must address the auction dynamics in terms of user arrival, user preference, and spectrum supply and here lies the importance of the proposed auction model.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate an online auction setting for spectrum allocation in the dynamic secondary market. In this setting, spectrum becomes available stochastically. Bidders' arrivals are also assumed to be stochastic and their lifetimes are also dynamic. We present two online auction mechanisms to allocate these randomly available spectrum among the bidders according to their value and urgency of transmission. The first mechanism, SOADE, works on a priority function that is derived from the distribution information of bidders and sellers. The mechanism allocates spectrum such that bidders with higher values and shorter lifetimes of demand receive a higher priority. The second mechanism xSOADE works without the distribution information and applies bid monotonicity and critical pricing to allocate spectrum and determine its price. Additionally, by allocating the same spectrum unit to non-interfering bidders, we achieve spectrum reusability. We show that both the mechanisms are individually rational for all agents, and ensure truthful reporting by both sellers and bidders. The proposed mechanisms are simulated under various distributional settings, and the results show significant increase in auction revenue in comparison to existing work.
